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Case Note 
COMPENSATION FOR ABUSED FOREIGN DOMESTIC 
WORKERS 
A Problem of Enforcement 
Tay Wee Kiat v Public Prosecutor 
[2018] 5 SLR 438; [2019] 5 SLR 1033 
In Tay Wee Kiat v Public Prosecutor [2018] 5 SLR 438; [2019] 
5 SLR 1033, two offenders who had abused a foreign 
domestic worker had been ordered to pay her compensation, 
on pain of a default term of imprisonment. When they failed 
to pay, the Prosecution applied for the compensation order 
to be enforced by way of attachment of the offenders’ 
property or garnishment of debts due to the offenders 
(“garnishment/attachment orders”). The High Court refused 
to make garnishment/attachment orders on the grounds that 
(a) the Prosecution had applied for such orders belatedly; 
and (b) such orders would lead to “undue protraction” of 
proceedings. This note argues that the High Court erred in 
so refusing. Compared to relying on default imprisonment 
terms as the means of enforcing compensation orders, 
making garnishment/attachment orders would better 
comport with the statutory compensation scheme for the 
High Court, be more economically efficient, and better 
promote the welfare of abused foreign domestic workers. 
Benjamin Joshua ONG* 
BA Jurisprudence (Oxon), BCL (Oxon); 
Advocate & Solicitor (Singapore); 
Assistant Professor of Law, Singapore Management University. 
I. Introduction 
1 Tay Wee Kiat v Public Prosecutor1 involved a married couple 
who repeatedly abused a foreign domestic worker named Fitriyah. Tay 
Wee Kiat’s treatment of Fitriyah between 2011 and 2012 was “plainly 
 
* The author is grateful to the anonymous reviewer for the useful comments 
received. The author is also grateful to Cacy Tan, Assistant Director of the 
Community Justice Centre, for her helpful clarifications regarding the scope of the 
Victim Assistance Scheme. All errors and omissions remain the author’s own. 
1 [2018] 4 SLR 1315; [2019] 5 SLR 1033. 
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cruel and almost sadistic” and amounted to a “serious affront to her 
dignity”.2 His wife Chia Yun Ling, while not as culpable, caused physical 
harm to Fitriyah in a manner that “bordered on the abusive”.3 (This is 
to say nothing about their similar crimes during the same period against 
another foreign domestic worker, Moe Moe Than).4 
2 For their offences against Fitriyah, Tay and Chia were 
sentenced to 43 months’ and two months’ imprisonment respectively. 
In addition, using its powers under s 359 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code5 (“CPC”), the High Court ordered the offenders to compensate 
Fitriyah for her pain and suffering and loss of prospective earnings: Tay 
and Chia were ordered to pay Fitriyah $5,900 and $1,900 respectively.6 
3 But Tay and Chia did not pay up for over a year. Eventually, 
despite the Prosecution’s efforts, the High Court declared that the 
offenders were to serve default terms of imprisonment instead of paying 
the compensation, and that nothing more could be done to make them 
pay.7 This state of affairs was brought about by what this note argues 
was an incorrect application of the statutory compensation scheme by 
the High Court. The High Court refused to make further orders under 
s 360 of the CPC, such as ordering that the offenders’ property be seized 
and sold and the proceeds used to pay Fitriyah. This note will argue that 
the High Court erred in so refusing, and ought to have made such 
orders. 
II. The purpose of compensation orders 
4 Under s 359 of the CPC, when a person is convicted of an 
offence, the court must “consider whether or not to make an order for 
the payment by that person of a sum to be fixed by the court by way of 
compensation to the person injured, or his representative, in respect of 
his person, character or property”. The compensation is in respect of 
losses arising from (a) offences of which the offender has been 
convicted; or (b) offences to which the offender has admitted and 
 
2 Tay Wee Kiat v Public Prosecutor [2018] 4 SLR 1315 at [79]. 
3 Public Prosecutor v Tay Wee Kiat [2017] SGDC 184 at [91]. 
4 Public Prosecutor v Chia Yun Ling [2019] SGMC 13. After the Prosecution’s 
appeals (MA 9063/2019/01 and MA 9057/2019/01), Tay Wee Kiat was sentenced to 
a total of 30 months’ imprisonment and Chia Yun Ling to 47 months’ 
imprisonment in respect of offences against Moe Moe Than. The sentences of 
imprisonment in respect of offences against Fitriyah were ordered to commence 
after the end of these sentences: Tay Wee Kiat v Public Prosecutor [2019] 5 SLR 
1033 at [1]. 
5 Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed. 
6 Tay Wee Kiat v Public Prosecutor [2018] 5 SLR 438 at [22]. 
7 Tay Wee Kiat v Public Prosecutor [2019] 5 SLR 1033. 
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consented to be “taken into consideration for the purposes of 
sentencing”.8 If the court is of the view that it would be “appropriate” to 
order compensation, then the court must do so.9 
5 The purpose of the compensation provisions is to serve as a 
“shortcut to the remedy that the victim could obtain in a civil suit 
against the offender”.10 Consider the following example: If an offender 
is convicted of voluntarily causing hurt to the victim, and has caused 
the victim to incur $100 in consulting and obtaining treatment from a 
doctor, the victim would be entitled to sue the offender for the tort of 
trespass to the person and be awarded $100 in damages. What the 
compensation regime does is to allow the court which convicted the 
offender to order that the offender pay $100 to the victim, without the 
victim having to incur the effort and expense of commencing a separate 
civil suit to recover the $100 as damages. This is particularly useful 
when the victim is “disadvantaged or poor” and therefore lacks the 
financial means to commence a civil suit.11 In particular, the High Court 
has previously recognised that “domestic maids are often, if not 
invariably, impecunious”.12 
6 One might next ask: What if the offender fails to pay the $100? 
That is why s 360 of the CPC exists. If the victim had brought civil 
proceedings against the offender, and the offender had been held liable 
to pay the victim $100 in damages, then the victim can seek to enforce 
the judgment debt by way of a writ of seizure and sale, the appointment 
of a receiver, or garnishee proceedings, or a combination of any of 
these.13 In addition, if the offender-defendant has the means to pay the 
debt but flat out refuses to do so, then the victim-plaintiff can apply for 
him to be committed for contempt of court and fined or imprisoned.14 
Likewise, s 360 of the CPC provides for various similar techniques for 
the enforcement of compensation orders, such as the following: 
(a) The court may stipulate a timeline for the payment of 
the compensation sum, which may involve payment by 
instalments.15 
 
8 Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) s 359(1) read with s 148. 
9 Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) s 359(2). 
10 Soh Meiyun v Public Prosecutor [2014] 3 SLR 299 at [56]. 
11 Public Prosecutor v AOB [2011] 2 SLR 793 at [23], elaborating on Public Prosecutor 
v Donohue Enilia [2005] 1 SLR(R) 220 at [19]. 
12 Soh Meiyun v Public Prosecutor [2014] 3 SLR 299 at [56]. 
13 Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) O 45 r 1(1). 
14 Mok Kah Hong v Zheng Zhuan Yao [2016] 3 SLR 1 at [92]. Note that the 
defendant’s committal and imprisonment for contempt of court do not preclude 
the plaintiff from taking other enforcement measures. 
15 Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) ss 360(a)–360(b). 
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(b) The court may order that the offender’s property be 
seized and sold (possibly by a receiver), and that the proceeds 
be applied toward payment of the compensation sum.16 
(c) The court may order that debts due to the offender be 
garnished and paid to the court instead, which the court will in 
turn apply toward payment of the compensation sum.17 
(d) The court may order that the offender be imprisoned in 
default of payment of the compensation sum.18 
(e) The court may order that the offender be searched, and 
any money found on him be applied toward payment of the 
compensation sum.19 
7 In short, the statutory compensation scheme shares two 
features in compensation with civil actions for damages: 
(a) First, both make it possible to order an offender 
(tortfeasor) to compensate the victim for harm arising from the 
crime (tort). 
(b) Second, both provide means to compel the payment of 
compensation by procedures such as seizure and sale of 
property and garnishment of debts. 
III. Summary of case 
8 This note seeks to discuss two judgments relating to Tay and 
Chia’s offences against Fitriyah which the High Court handed down 
after the convictions. In the first20 (“Tay Wee Kiat (Compensation 
Order)”), the High Court rightly recognised and gave effect to the first 
feature of the compensation regime. The High Court calculated the 
amount of compensation in the same way that a court would calculate 
the sum of damages in tort. For example, the High Court used the 
Guidelines for the Assessment of General Damages in Personal Injury 
Cases21 as a guide to compensation for pain and suffering,22 and applied 
a principle akin to the doctrine of mitigation in compensating the 
victim for loss of income only for the period during which it would not 
 
16 Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) s 360(c). 
17 Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) s 360(ca). 
18 Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) s 360(d). 
19 Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) s 360(e). 
20 Tay Wee Kiat v Public Prosecutor [2018] 5 SLR 438. 
21 The Subordinate Courts of Singapore, Guidelines for the Assessment of General 
Damages in Personal Injury Cases (Academy Publishing, 2010). 
22 Tay Wee Kiat v Public Prosecutor [2018] 5 SLR 438 at [19]. 
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have been practical for her to find alternative employment.23 These 
approaches are perfectly right, and are perfectly in line with the purpose 
of compensation as serving as a “shortcut” to granting the victim what 
the victim could obtain in a suit in tort. 
9 However, the High Court’s second judgment24 (“Tay Wee Kiat 
(Enforcement Decision)”) had the effect of frustrating the second feature 
of the compensation regime, by rendering the compensation order 
effectively unenforceable in cases where the offenders chose to serve a 
default jail term instead. What happened was this: When the High 
Court made the compensation order on 8 May 2018, it ordered that Tay 
and Chia be imprisoned in default of payment of compensation.25 For 
over a year, Tay and Chia failed to pay the compensation due to 
Fitriyah. On 20 September 2019, the Prosecution sought an order that 
debts owed to them be garnished and/or their property be attached 
(“garnishment/attachment orders”). The High Court refused to make 
such orders, and the offenders chose to serve the default imprisonment 
terms instead of paying compensation.26 As a result, the victim could 
recover nothing by way of the statutory compensation scheme; she 
would only have been able to recover compensation from the offenders 
by commencing a separate action against them.27 
IV. Discussion 
10 There were two reasons for the High Court’s refusal to make 
garnishment/attachment orders. 
A. Delay in application for compensation order 
11 The first reason was that it was too late for such orders to be 
sought: “if the Prosecution had wanted to seek orders for examination 
and garnishment, the necessary directions ought to have been sought at 
the last hearing before us”.28 Instead, “in cases where the Prosecution is 
seeking a compensation order, the Prosecution should also consider 
which of the default mechanisms prescribed in s 360(1) CPC it wishes 
to seek”.29 
 
23 Tay Wee Kiat v Public Prosecutor [2018] 5 SLR 438 at [13] and [20]–[21]. 
24 Tay Wee Kiat v Public Prosecutor [2019] 5 SLR 1033. 
25 Tay Wee Kiat v Public Prosecutor [2018] 5 SLR 438 at [22]. 
26 Tay Wee Kiat v Public Prosecutor [2019] 5 SLR 1033 at [8]. 
27 That is, an action for the tort of trespass to the person. 
28 Tay Wee Kiat v Public Prosecutor [2019] 5 SLR 1033 at [4]. 
29 Tay Wee Kiat v Public Prosecutor [2019] 5 SLR 1033 at [5]. 
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12 This is questionable. As the High Court recognised, “s 360(1) of 
the CPC does not limit the court to one mode of enforcing payment of 
compensation”.30 Why, then, ought the court to decline to make a 
garnishment/attachment order by reason only of the Prosecution’s 
delay in seeking one? 
13 The High Court did not clearly elaborate on the answer to this 
question. One possible answer is the risk of prejudice to the offender. 
But there is no such risk. As has been seen,31 it would have been open to 
the victim to (successfully) sue the offenders in tort and then enforce 
the judgment debt by various means, and these means are similar to 
those set out in s 360(1) of the CPC. In other words, whether or not the 
court makes an order under s 360(1) of the CPC, it would still be 
possible for these procedures to be invoked against the offenders. So it 
cannot be said that the use of multiple modes of enforcement under 
s 360(1) occasions any prejudice to the offenders. To the contrary, the 
proceedings would end faster, and the offenders would sooner be able 
to move on with their lives, than if separate civil proceedings were to be 
instituted against them. 
B. “Undue protraction” of proceedings 
14 The High Court’s second reason for refusing to grant the 
Prosecution’s application for garnishment/attachment orders was that:32 
... [this] would result in precisely what the compensation regime 
under the CPC should seek to avoid – undue protraction of 
proceedings by converting a concluded criminal matter into ‘quasi-
civil’ enforcement proceedings over which extended judicial oversight 
has to be exercised. 
15 In support of this view, the High Court stated that it had 
“cautioned against such a prospect” in its previous judgment in Tay 
Wee Kiat (Compensation Order). The relevant extract from Tay Wee 
Kiat (Compensation Order) is as follows:33 
... compensation ought only to be ordered in clear cases where the fact 
and extent of damage are either agreed or readily and easily 
ascertainable on the evidence. This is because compensation is an 
ancillary power of a criminal court and should not usurp its core 
functions of trying and sentencing accused persons. Though the court 
must consider the issue of compensation, this should not assume the 
 
30 Tay Wee Kiat v Public Prosecutor [2019] 5 SLR 1033 at [4]. 
31 See para 0 above. 
32 Tay Wee Kiat v Public Prosecutor [2019] 5 SLR 1033 at [5]. 
33 Tay Wee Kiat v Public Prosecutor [2018] 5 SLR 438 at [8], cited in Tay Wee Kiat v 
Public Prosecutor [2019] 5 SLR 1033 at [5]. 
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proportions of a full-blown inquiry or take on a life of its own. It 
should not excessively protract the ultimate disposal of the case. 
Equally, the offender should not be disadvantaged by having the 
victim’s claim for compensation determined in a criminal forum 
instead of under the more formal and structured procedure in the 
Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed). 
16 It will now be argued the High Court in Tay Wee Kiat 
(Enforcement Decision) had cited its own decision in Tay Wee Kiat 
(Compensation Order) out of context. When Tay Wee Kiat 
(Compensation Order) spoke of the need to prevent “excessively 
protract[ing]” proceedings, the court’s concern was that the quantum of 
compensation must not be calculated in a manner to which the rules of 
procedure in compensation proceedings are not suited. However, in 
Tay Wee Kiat (Enforcement Decision), the High Court misconstrued 
this as a concern that the enforcement of a compensation order must not 
take too much time and resources. It will now be shown that this was 
incorrect, and that, consequently, the High Court erred in refusing to 
make garnishment/attachment orders. 
(1) The High Court’s concerns in Tay Wee Kiat (Enforcement 
Decision) about protraction of proceedings 
17 In Tay Wee Kiat (Enforcement Decision), the High Court held 
that preventing “undue protraction of proceedings” meant avoiding 
“converting a concluded criminal matter into ‘quasi-civil’ enforcement 
proceedings over which extended judicial oversight has to be 
exercised”.34 According to the High Court, such enforcement 
proceedings would mean that:35 
... [t]he court would have to direct further inquiries into the offenders’ 
means and assets, and thereafter consider the further exercise of its 
powers under s 360(1) of the CPC. This places undue strain on limited 
judicial resources and investigative resources ... 
This is problematic for several reasons. 
(a) Congruence with statutory scheme 
18 First, the statutory scheme clearly does envisage that 
compensation orders be enforced through means similar to the means 
of enforcement of civil judgment debts. That is the very point of s 360 of 
the CPC, which, like the Rules of Court, provides for enforcement 
through garnishment, seizure and sale, or the appointment of a receiver. 
 
34 Tay Wee Kiat v Public Prosecutor [2019] 5 SLR 1033 at [5]. 
35 Tay Wee Kiat v Public Prosecutor [2019] 5 SLR 1033 at [5]. 
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The High Court’s reasoning, taken to its logical conclusion, would 
render most of s 360 redundant by making it impossible for these 
means of enforcement to be used despite the fact that the Legislature 
has envisaged that they be used. 
19 It is true that this would use some state resources. But why 
would this be “undue”? If we accept the High Court’s statement in 
Public Prosecutor v Donohue Enilia36 that “the court must be satisfied 
that the accused either has the means available, or will have the means, 
to pay the compensation within a reasonable time”,37 then we must 
accept that there must be a mechanism for evidence as to the offender’s 
means to be gathered and placed before the court – and surely the 
Prosecution must be the one who adduces evidence that the offender 
has means, and the one who takes the lead in testing evidence to the 
contrary. Anyway, the issue of the State having to bear the costs of this 
can hardly be a concern when, as in Tay Wee Kiat, the State itself is 
willing and, moreover, desires to bear these costs. 
(b) Economic efficiency 
20 Second, it would be more economically efficient for 
enforcement to take place through the criminal compensation 
procedure rather than through separate civil proceedings. 
21 The concern that applications for garnishment/attachment 
orders would take up judicial resources is neither here nor there. This is 
because there would be the same use of judicial resources if the victim 
were, in the course of civil proceedings, to apply for the judgment 
debtor to be examined to determine what his assets were. 
22 Moreover, there would be additional strain on judicial 
resources if the victim were expected to initiate separate civil 
proceedings instead of enforcement taking place through the 
compensation process. By the time an accused person has been 
convicted and sentenced, the trial judge will be intimately acquainted 
with the facts of the case. This includes facts pertaining to the harm 
suffered by the victim (for such facts are relevant in sentencing).38 This 
being so, it would consume less judicial resources for that trial judge to 
hear and determine the application for compensation, as opposed to 
 
36 [2005] 1 SLR(R) 220 at [26]. 
37 Public Prosecutor v Donohue Enilia [2005] 1 SLR(R) 220 at [26]. 
38 This is particularly so if the Prosecution tenders a victim impact statement as part 
of its submissions on sentencing: see s 228 of the Criminal Procedure Code 
(Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed). 
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separate civil proceedings in which a second judge would have to re-
acquaint himself with the facts and evidence.39 
23 The same can be said about investigative resources. As the High 
Court itself recognised in Tay Wee Kiat (Compensation Order), police 
investigation officers (“IOs”) are “vested with investigative powers and 
will be familiar with both parties”.40 One would think, given these 
powers and pre-existing familiarity with the case, that it would be more 
resource-efficient to have the police to gather evidence relevant to the 
compensation sum than for the victim (as plaintiff in a separate civil 
action) to do so. 
24 Therefore, the starting point is that it would be more 
economically efficient for the enforcement process to be handled by the 
State rather than a private lawyer representing the victim in separate 
proceedings. This is all the more so when the State has already invested 
resources in ascertaining the sum of compensation payable, which 
would be needlessly reduplicated were separate civil proceedings to be 
held. 
(c) Promoting victims’ welfare 
25 This being so, the real concern is not one of saving resources, 
but rather one of who should bear the cost of those resources. Perhaps 
the CPC ought to be amended to make the offender pay the costs 
incurred by the State in conducting investigations to determine the 
appropriate compensation sum.41 After all, if separate civil proceedings 
would be held, the offender-defendant would have to pay such costs 
anyway.42 But – and this is the third point – even if it is not legally 
possible for the offender to be held liable for the costs of compensation 
proceedings against him, there is a compelling case for the State to bear 
 
39 During debates in Parliament, at least one Member of Parliament raised this very 
issue (see Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (18 May 2010) vol 87 
at col 441 (Michael Palmer)): 
Section 359 of the revised CPC Bill will require the Court to actively consider 
ordering compensation after every conviction. This is indeed a very sensible 
change because the Judge presiding over the criminal trial is fully apprised of 
the facts and is in the best position to decide on the appropriate compensation 
for the victim. Making the victim bring separate civil proceedings simply 
means excessive costs and delay for the victim as well as a waste of the Court’s 
time because all the evidence will have to be revisited. 
However, there was no further discussion of this point. 
40 Tay Wee Kiat v Public Prosecutor [2018] 5 SLR 438 at [14]. 
41 Currently, the offender can only be ordered to pay costs if his defence was 
“conducted in an extravagant and unnecessary manner”: Criminal Procedure Code 
(Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) s 355(1). 
42 The general rule is that costs follow the event. 
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these costs. In declaring “‘quasi-civil’ enforcement proceedings” an 
“undue strain” on state resources, the High Court paid insufficient 
attention to the very point of compensation orders, namely, to help 
victims who lack their own resources to seek compensation by 
themselves. As the High Court itself put it in Tay Wee Kiat 
(Compensation Order), the police ought to see their work “not as a 
chore or imposition but as a fundamental facet of their role as enforcers 
of the law”.43 The same, it is submitted, ought to be said of the 
Prosecution. The High Court continued:44 
In a well-functioning criminal justice system, thorough investigative 
work should ensure that factually guilty persons are convicted and 
sentenced, but this may afford little comfort in practical terms to the 
victim, who may be left to suffer the consequences of abuse. This is 
especially true in the case of domestic helpers who have come to 
Singapore for work, but instead find themselves jobless pending 
criminal investigations against their employers. An effective 
mechanism for collection and payment of compensation serves to 
achieve a more just outcome for such persons and there is no better 
person than the IO to see this through. 
26 This represents a burden which the State has to bear; but it is a 
burden that the Legislature, through s 360 of the CPC, has required the 
State to bear. This being so, it would be wrong to prioritise conserving 
state resources and keeping proceedings as short as possible: that is 
not – and should not be – the only aim of the law. 
(2) The true problem of protraction of proceedings, as recognised in 
Tay Wee Kiat (Compensation Order) 
27 What, then, was the High Court in Tay Wee Kiat 
(Compensation Order) truly concerned about when it spoke of 
preventing “undue protraction of proceedings”? 
28 The author will begin with the High Court’s statement that 
“compensation is an ancillary power of a criminal court and should not 
usurp its core functions of trying and sentencing accused persons”.45 
The use of the phrase “criminal court” is potentially misleading in so far 
as it suggests an institutional division between “criminal” and civil 
courts. Nothing in the law forbids judges who hear criminal cases from 
also hearing civil cases. The judges who hear criminal cases are perfectly 
capable of applying the law of torts and of assessing compensation 
sums. Even if such an institutional distinction existed, ss 359 and 360 of 
the CPC clearly envisage that it is the function of a criminal court to 
 
43 Tay Wee Kiat v Public Prosecutor [2018] 5 SLR 438 at [14]. 
44 Tay Wee Kiat v Public Prosecutor [2018] 5 SLR 438 at [14]. 
45 Tay Wee Kiat v Public Prosecutor [2018] 5 SLR 438 at [8]. 
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consider making a compensation order,46 and therefore to consider the 
principles of the civil law of torts according to which the compensation 
sum is to be calculated. 
29 Instead, it appears that the true difference which the High 
Court sought to draw in Tay Wee Kiat (Compensation Order) is not 
between a “criminal court” and a civil court, but rather between 
criminal and civil procedure. The High Court’s elaboration in 
Compensation Order on its concern about “excessive[e] protract[ion]” 
was as follows: the court should not find itself “enmeshed in refined 
questions of causation which may arise in claims for damages under 
contract law or tort law”47 and should not attempt to “determin[e] … 
complex issues of apportionment of liability and precise quantification 
of multiple specific heads of losses”.48 
30 For these propositions, Tay Wee Kiat (Compensation Order) 
cited the 1995 High Court case of Public Prosecutor v Donohue Enilia, 
which cited a series of English cases for various propositions relating to 
“deciding whether a compensation order should be granted”.49 An 
examination of these cases, as explained by the High Court in Soh 
Meiyun v Public Prosecutor50 (“Soh Meiyun”), reveals one principle: the 
court will not make a compensation order to the extent that 
determining the quantum of compensation would require extensive 
evidence which is not, and cannot easily be brought, before the court. 
Examples include: 
(a) Compensation for the loss of use of property. An 
example is R v Kenneth Donovan51 (“Kenneth Donovan”), in 
which the offender committed the offence of taking a 
conveyance without consent by renting a car for two days but 
 
46 See also Wing-Cheong Chan, “Compensation Orders in Singapore, Malaysia and 
India: A Call for Rejuvenation” in Support for Victims of Crime in Asia (Wing-
Cheong Chan ed) (Routledge, 2008) ch 18 at p 375: even if there has been a “divide 
in the minds of those who are legally trained between criminal law (which is to 
punish offenders …) and civil law (which is to resolve private disputes …)” 
according to which “the civil remedies … can have no place in the criminal justice 
system”, this “divide” has now been “unmistakably breached” by the very 
introduction of a compensation regime. 
47 Tay Wee Kiat v Public Prosecutor [2018] 5 SLR 438 at [9], quoting Public 
Prosecutor v Donohue Enilia [2005] 1 SLR(R) 220 at [22]. 
48 Tay Wee Kiat v Public Prosecutor [2018] 5 SLR 438 at [9], citing Public Prosecutor v 
Donohue Enilia [2005] 1 SLR(R) 220 at [23]–[24] and Soh Meiyun v Public 
Prosecutor [2014] 3 SLR 299 at [58]. 
49 Public Prosecutor v Donohue Enilia [2005] 1 SLR(R) 220 at [20]. The High Court 
cited the English cases at [21]–[24]. 
50 [2014] 3 SLR 299. 
51 (1981) 3 Cr App R (S) 192. 
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failing to return it for several months.52 The problem was that 
“the quantum of damages for loss of use was notoriously open 
to argument, and this case [was] therefore not one of the kind 
for which a compensation order is designed”.53 
(b) Compensation for the loss of light. An example is R v 
Reginald Briscoe54 (“Reginald Briscoe”), in which the offender 
had built extensions to his house, so as to create a second storey 
over parts of the house. His offence was failing to comply with a 
planning enforcement notice ordering him to tear down the 
extensions.55 As the Court of Appeal of England and Wales 
pointed out (and the Singapore High Court recognised in Soh 
Meiyun),56 there was no evidence that the neighbours had 
thereby suffered any loss57 and, besides, it would be impossible 
to quantify the neighbours’ “suffering of loss of light ... in the 
absence of expert evidence”.58 
(c) Cases where the presence or absence of a causal link 
between a criminal act and a person’s injuries is in doubt. In R v 
Claire Deary59 (“Claire Deary”), the offender pleaded guilty to 
affray in a pub. A bystander was injured, but it was not clear 
whether the injury was caused by the offender. Therefore, a 
compensation order was not to be made, because “there was no 
proven causal link between [the offender’s] criminal conduct in 
affray and the injury actually suffered by [the alleged victim]”.60 
31 In other words, a careful examination of the English cases 
shows that the courts’ true concern is not a desire to shorten criminal 
proceedings, but rather concern over the suitability of criminal 
proceedings to receive such evidence. This makes eminent sense: 
(a) Unlike civil proceedings, criminal proceedings do not 
have a mechanism by which such evidence (especially expert 
evidence) might be received, such as discovery, the exchange of 
affidavits of evidence-in-chief, and the cross-examination of 
witnesses to test the evidence contained in those affidavits. 
These would have been necessary to resolve the questions of 
quantum of compensation in Kenneth Donovan and Reginald 
 
52 R v Kenneth Donovan (1981) 3 Cr App R (S) 192. 
53 R v Kenneth Donovan (1981) 3 Cr App R (S) 192 at 193; the High Court quoted 
these words in Soh Meiyun v Public Prosecutor [2014] 3 SLR 299 at [58]. 
54 (1994) 15 Cr App R (S) 699. 
55 R v Reginald Briscoe (1994) 15 Cr App R (S) 699. 
56 Soh Meiyun v Public Prosecutor [2014] 3 SLR 299 at [58]. 
57 R v Reginald Briscoe (1994) 15 Cr App R (S) 699 at 700. 
58 R v Reginald Briscoe (1994) 15 Cr App R (S) 699 at 701. 
59 (1993) 14 Cr App R (S) 648. 
60 R v Claire Deary (1993) 14 Cr App R (S) 648 at 649. 
 Compensation for Abused Foreign Domestic Workers: 
 A Problem of Enforcement  
 
Briscoe (in which expert evidence was required). In situations 
involving complex factual enquiries, there is a greater risk that 
evidence that has not been through such procedures may be 
insufficient or unreliable. 
(b) When the evidence before the court (or, if the offender 
pleads guilty, the charges and admitted statement of facts) does 
not disclose a tort against the alleged victim, the fact of 
conviction does not itself furnish an evidential basis for holding 
that compensation is owed. This explains Claire Deary: in that 
case, while the offender had pleaded guilty to affray, the 
evidence did not show that violence had been used toward the 
particular alleged victim, who was therefore not entitled to 
compensation. 
32 Let us illustrate this point using the following hypothetical 
example. Suppose the offender commits the offence of voluntarily 
causing grievous hurt61 by breaking the victim’s arm, causing the victim 
to have to undergo surgery followed by a long-term course of 
physiotherapy. The victim has just undergone surgery but has not yet 
commenced physiotherapy. In that case: 
(a) In the course of convicting the accused, the court will 
receive evidence showing that the accused has caused the victim 
to suffer the injury (for causation is an element of the offence). 
Further, the court will either receive evidence, or take judicial 
notice, of the fact that surgery is necessary in order to treat the 
injury. Taken together, all this will be sufficient to show that the 
victim can recover compensation for the surgery. Further, 
a medical bill will ordinarily suffice to quantify this head of 
compensation. 
(b) In the course of convicting and sentencing the accused, 
the court is likely to receive evidence revealing the extent of 
pain and suffering which the victim has suffered. That evidence 
will be sufficient for the court to arrive at a figure of 
compensation to be paid in respect of pain and suffering. 
(c) However, the court is unlikely to have evidence 
revealing the nature or extent of physiotherapy required. There 
may be various factors which have a bearing on the required 
duration and costs of physiotherapy, such as the presence or 
absence of surgical complications which may take some time to 
manifest, or factors intrinsic to the victim’s body that affect how 
quickly he/she recovers. That is not to say that the cost of 
physiotherapy is unquantifiable, but quantifying it may require 
 
61 Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) s 322 read with s 320. 
 
 Singapore Academy of Law Journal  
 
expert evidence,62 which cannot reliably be received by the 
court through the criminal process (as compared to the civil 
process).63 
33 In such a situation, the court ought to order compensation in 
respect of pain and suffering and the costs of surgery, but not the costs 
of physiotherapy.64 It is true that this will have the effect of shortening 
the proceedings. But this is only a side effect of limiting compensation to 
that which can be proven through reliable evidence in so far as may be 
obtained under the rules of criminal procedure; shortening the 
proceedings is not the court’s aim. 
34 It is in this sense that the phrase “undue protraction of 
proceedings” ought to be understood. That phrase has nothing at all to 
do with the question of enforcement. Therefore, in Tay Wee Kiat 
(Enforcement Decision), it was not correct for the High Court to cite a 
fear of “undue protraction of proceedings” as a reason to refuse to make 
garnishment/attachment orders. 
V. Default terms of imprisonment as means of enforcement? 
35 It is true that the High Court’s approach of relying on default 
imprisonment terms to encourage offenders to pay compensation may 
sometimes work: “[i]n most cases, offenders with sufficient means are 
 
62 For an example of a Singapore case in which the court declined to order 
compensation in respect of medical treatment where the nature of the necessary 
treatment and its costs were uncertain, see Low Song Chye v Public Prosecutor 
[2019] 5 SLR 526. In that case, the Prosecution had requested a compensation 
order to cover the costs of a hearing aid for the victim. However, the High Court 
refused to allow compensation on this basis, because: 
(a) “the type of hearing aid suitable for the victim can only be determined 
with a hearing aid evaluation appointment with an audiologist”; 
(b) the costs of the hearing aid would depend on the type of hearing aid; 
and 
(c) “there is no suggestion that a hearing aid was strictly necessary, or even 
desired by the victim” ([114]). 
While the High Court allowed the compensation order made by the lower court to 
stand, that was on the basis that it could be rationalised as compensation for pain 
and suffering instead of compensation to cover the costs of a hearing aid. 
63 In civil proceedings, various procedures relating to expert evidence set out in the 
Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) O 40 and O 40A are available. These 
include the court’s power to appoint an independent expert (O 40 rr 1–2); 
requirements as to the contents of experts’ reports (O 40A r 3); the possibility of 
putting questions in writing to experts (O 40A r 4); and court-directed discussions 
between experts (O 40A r 5). By contrast, the Rules of Court do not apply to 
criminal proceedings: O 1 r 2(2)(5). 
64 The victim will still be able to commence a separate civil action for the costs of 
physiotherapy only: Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) s 359(4). 
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likely to pay (and do pay) the compensation amount to avoid serving 
the default term”.65 
36 But in the case of an offender who has been sentenced to a 
relatively long term of imprisonment, the marginal impact of the 
default term of imprisonment may be so small that the offender might 
well prefer to serve the default term instead of paying compensation. 
The CPC provides that the default term of imprisonment may be for a 
period of up to six months.66 Therefore, if an offender who is sentenced 
to a term of imprisonment so long that an additional six months’ 
default term is small in comparison, he might well choose to serve the 
default term instead of paying compensation. 
37 Besides, it would appear that the courts are minded to order a 
default term which is far shorter than the statutory maximum of six 
months. The CPC provides that the maximum length of the default 
term of imprisonment varies according to the sum of compensation 
payable: two months if the compensation sum is $50 or less; four 
months if the sum is between $50 and $100; six months if the 
compensation sum is more than $100.67 In Tay Wee Kiat, the High 
Court ordered Tay to pay $5,900 in compensation, yet imposed a 
default jail term of just four weeks. 
38 It is in this light that we need to consider the High Court’s 
statement that “[w]hile there may be others who might choose not to 
pay compensation or remain adamant on not paying in any event, these 
persons constitute the minority”.68 With respect, this statement is 
hardly of any comfort at all to the “minority” of victims: does criminal 
law not aim to protect them too? 
VI. Victim Assistance Scheme 
39 In Enforcement Decision,69 the High Court suggested that a 
person in Fitriyah’s position may turn to the Community Justice 
Centre’s70 (“CJC’s”) Victim Assistance Scheme71 (“VAS”). This can be a 
 
65 Tay Wee Kiat v Public Prosecutor [2019] 5 SLR 1033 at [6]. 
66 Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) s 360(4)(c). 
67 Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) s 360(4). 
68 Tay Wee Kiat v Public Prosecutor [2019] 5 SLR 1033 at [6]. 
69 Tay Wee Kiat v Public Prosecutor [2019] 5 SLR 1033 at [7]. 
70 The Community Justice Centre is a registered charity and institution of a public 
character which aims, inter alia, to “ensure that the justice system remains 
accessible to all, regardless of status or race”: Criminal Justice Centre, “Who We 
Are” https://cjc.org.sg/about/who-we-are/ (accessed 24 March 2020). 
71 Criminal Justice Centre, “Victim Assistance Scheme” https://www.cjc.org. 
sg/services/social-support/victim-assistance-scheme/ (accessed 18 March 2020). 
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useful source of help for victims: the VAS, at the CJC’s discretion, can 
reimburse a victim of violent crimes for medical and other expenses 
(including expenses related to trauma caused by pain and suffering) if 
the victim cannot obtain compensation from the offender.72 At the same 
time, however, it is necessary to bear in mind that the VAS is limited, in 
that one can only claim up to $1,000 from the VAS. By comparison, 
Fitriyah had suffered losses to the tune of almost eight times that.73 This 
is no criticism of the VAS, which is indeed laudable (as are various 
other social support agencies that can support victims of crime); it 
merely reflects that the VAS is a safety net (in the CJC’s words, a source 
of “interim [fi]nancial support”)74 but cannot (and does not purport to) 
replace the need for compensation orders to be effectively enforceable.75 
VII. Conclusion 
40 This note has argued that: 
(a) The court should not decline to make an order under 
s 360 of the CPC to enforce the payment of compensation by 
reason only that the Prosecution did not ask for that order as 
early as possible. 
(b) The court should not, in the name of not protracting 
criminal proceedings, limit itself to imposing a default 
imprisonment term under s 360(1)(d) of the CPC and decline 
to make some other type of order under s 360 of the CPC, 
including garnishment/attachment orders. This is despite the 
fact that some judicial supervision over the carrying out of 
those orders would be required. 
(c) The courts’ concerns relating to the “protraction” of 
proceedings for compensation ought to be limited to concerns 
regarding the sufficiency of evidence which is relevant to the 
quantum of compensation, and not concerns regarding the 
time it will take for a compensation order to be enforced. 
 
72 Criminal Justice Centre, “Victim Assistance Scheme” https://www.cjc.org 
.sg/services/social-support/victim-assistance-scheme/ (accessed 18 March 2020). 
73 The total sum of compensation which Fitriyah was owed is $7,800: Tay Wee Kiat v 
Public Prosecutor [2018] 5 SLR 438 at [22]. 
74 Community Justice Centre, Annual Report 2018 at p 6 https://cjc.org.sg/wp-
content/uploads/2019/08/CJC-annual-report-2018.pdf (accessed 24 March 2020). 
75 Besides the issue of the amount of financial support, a broader point is that any 
victim of crime does not necessarily have a legal right to support from charities and 
social support agencies, whereas he or she does have a legal right to compensation 
from the offender. 
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(d) The following points do not completely make up for a 
refusal to enforce compensation orders by way of 
garnishment/attachment orders: 
(i) the victim may seek to be compensated 
through the Community Justice Centre’s Victim 
Assistance Scheme; 
(ii) a default imprisonment term can be imposed 
under s 360(1)(d) of the CPC so as to incentivise the 
offender to pay compensation. 
41 This note has not discussed the question of whether the court 
ought to refrain from making a compensation order on the ground of 
the offender’s impecuniosity. That is perhaps a topic for another note.76 
But that point did not arise in Tay Wee Kiat: there is no way of knowing 
whether or not the offenders had the means to pay compensation to 
Fitriyah, because the High Court declined to order even that they be 
examined. 
42 What is clear is that the intended beneficiaries of criminal 
compensation are those who cannot afford to commence separate civil 
proceedings, including foreign domestic workers, who “are often, if not 
invariably, impecunious”.77 Fitriyah had been paid $450 per month.78 By 
contrast, to make a claim in the Magistrate’s Court for damages, the fee 
 
76 Note that, when s 98 of the Criminal Justice Reform Act 2018 (Act 16 of 2018) 
comes into force, s 359(2B) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) 
will require the court to “have regard to the offender’s means so far as those means 
appear or are known to the court”. However, it is submitted that the offender’s 
impecuniosity should not lead the court to refuse to order him to pay 
compensation, just as a civil court will not refuse to order a tortfeasor to pay 
damages merely because the tortfeasor is impecunious. At most, the offender’s 
impecuniosity ought to be relevant only to the means in which the compensation is 
to be paid, eg, whether the court will allow the compensation sum to be paid in 
instalments. That said, consider the arguments of Stanley Yeo, “Compensating 
Victims of Crime in Singapore” (1984) 26 MLR 219 at 225–226 on the possibility 
of allowing offenders who are in prison to work to earn wages, part of which can be 
used to satisfy the compensation order. 
77 Soh Meiyun v Public Prosecutor [2014] 3 SLR 299 at [56]. 
78 Tay Wee Kiat v Public Prosecutor [2018] 5 SLR 438 at [20]. The offences against 
Fitriyah took place between 2011 and 2012. For completeness, it should be noted 
that in 2015, the Indonesian Embassy stated that the minimum salary for an 
Indonesian domestic worker (such as Fitriyah) ought to be $550: Amelia Teng, 
“Higher Pay for Indonesian Maids from Next Year” The Straits Times 
(11 November 2015); Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in Singapore, 
“Indonesian Embassy’s Respond to Strait Times Article 09 May 2018” (10 May 
2018) <https://fdw.indonesianlabour.sg/Home/NewsDetail/1> (accessed 18 March 
2020). 
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for commencing proceedings is $100,79 the fee to set down the matter 
for trial is another $150,80 and the fee to issue a writ of seizure and sale 
to enforce the judgment is $15581 – and this is to say nothing of other 
costs (which are likely to eclipse the court fees), such as lawyers’ fees. 
Moreover, foreign domestic workers are not eligible for legal aid.82 
Surely one ought to be concerned that a foreign domestic worker who is 
potentially in a financially precarious situation may have to pay such a 
large proportion of her salary in order to obtain compensation. 
(Though she may be able to recover some of her costs – indeed, even if 
she were to be able to recover all of her costs – she would still have to 
make payment upfront first. Moreover, while the Registrar has the 
power to waive the payment of court fees,83 she is not bound to do so.) 
43 It is against this backdrop that this note has called for an 
increased judicial use of s 360 of the CPC to enforce compensation 
orders. That may increase the burden on the State, and put more “strain 
on limited judicial resources and investigative resources”; but we ought 
to think seriously about whether this burden is not one that the State 
ought to bear, and for which the State ought to allocate more resources. 
The alternative would be to run the risk that a domestic worker who has 
been abused will find herself legally entitled to compensation which she 
is practically unable to claim. 
44 When s 98 of the Criminal Justice Reform Act84 comes into 
force, the court will be empowered to make a “financial circumstances 
order”, which will require the offender to  provide “any statement and 
evidence of the offender’s financial circumstances that the court may 
require”.85 While it will not be compulsory for the court to make such 
an order, it is hoped that this note has made the case for the court being 
 
79 Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) Appendix B, row 1. It would not have 
been possible for the victim to commence a claim in the small claims tribunals. 
This is because the small claims tribunals only have jurisdiction to hear and 
determine “specified claim[s]”, and a claim in respect of personal injury caused by 
an intentional tort is not a “specified claim”: Small Claims Tribunals Act (Cap 308, 
1998 Rev Ed) s 5(1)(a) read with the Schedule. 
80 Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) Appendix B, row 14. 
81 Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) Appendix B, row 17(b). 
82 Legal aid is only available to citizens or permanent residents of Singapore: Legal 
Aid and Advice Act (Cap 160, 2014 Rev Ed) s 5(1). 
83 Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) O 91 r 5(a). 
84 Act 16 of 2018. 
85 This definition will be set out in the new s 359(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code 
(Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed). The new s 359(2C) will provide: “Before making an order 
under subsection (1) against an offender, the court may make a financial 
circumstances order in relation to the offender.” Section 359(6) will provide that, if 
the offender is aged under 18, then the financial circumstances order may require a 
parent of the offender to give a statement of the parent’s financial circumstances. 
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far more willing to make one – and to make subsequent orders for 
enforcement – than the High Court was in Tay Wee Kiat. 
 
